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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI 
CASE NO: 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court erred in denying Appellant's 
Motion To Suppress because the County Attorney failed to properly 
authorize or apply for a Telecommunications Intercept Order and 
whether the Order was void on its face because it authorized 
interception for a period of time in excess of that permitted by 
The Act. 
2. Whether the June 27th Application was fatal as a 
result of the absence of any indication that the Deputy County 
Attorney was specifically designated by the County Attorney to 
make the Application. 
3. Whether evidence obtained pursuant to the 
Telecommunications Orders should have been suppressed. 
4. Whether Appellant was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This case was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. On 
October 5, 1989, judge Davidson filed the opinion affirming the 
trial Court in all aspects. A copy of this opinion is attached 
to this Petition as "Addendum #1". 
JURISDICTION 
This Petition For Writ Of Certiorari is brought pursuant 
to the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 42. The trial on 
this case was before the Weber County Second Judicial District 
Court, Judge David Roth presiding, on February 19, 1987. 
Appellant was convicted of a second degree felony. A Notice Of 
Appeal was filed but*dismissed June 1, 1987 for failure to 
prosecute. Following a habeas Corpus action, Appellant was 
resentenced and filed a new Notice Of Appeal on June 6, 1988. He 
was subsequently released on a Certificate of Probable Cause 
pending Appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on 
October 5, 1989. An Order was signed by Justice Orme, Utah Court 
of Appeals, continuing Appellant's Certificate pending a decision 
on Appellant's Petition. Prior to the expiration of the thirty 
(30) day period an Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time was made 
and a corresponding Order was signed by the Supreme Court extend-
ing the time for filing this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari for 
ii 
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an additional thirty (30) days. The date of entry of the Order 
extending time is October 17, 1989. Jurisdiction is conferred on 
this Court pursuant Rule 4 3 (4) of the Utah Rules of the Supreme 
Court, in that the Court of Appeals has decided an important 
question of state law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by this Court. Therefore, a Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari is 
proper. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OP STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Annotated §77-23a-l through 16. Set out 
in its entirety in Appellant's "Addendum #2. 
2. United States Constitution, 6th Amendment: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right....to have the assistance of counsel 
for his defense. 
3. Utah Constitution; Article 1, Section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant appealed a bench verdict finding him 
guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute for 
value. The trial Court denied Appellant's Motion to Suppress on 
the grounds that the County Attorneys' failure to sign the 
telecommunication's intercept application was not fatal. Defense 
iii 
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counsel neglected to object to the Application for an extension 
of time during which to intercept phone messages on the grounds 
that the application was not made by a Deputy County Attorney 
specifically designated by the County Attorney to authorize such 
an application. This failure to object was plain error and 
deprived Appellant of his Constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel. The Utah Court of Appeals, on October 5, 
1989, filed an opinion affirming the trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 23, 1986, Judge Wahlquist of Ogden, Utah 
signed an Ex Parte Order authorizing the interception of tele-
phonic communications to and from the telephone of Appellant, 
(Addendum #3 & T.T. @ Pg. 36). The Order purported to authorize 
interception of wire communications commencing on May 29, 1986, 
but not to exceed thirty days past June 28, 1986. This Order is 
based on an application that was Notarized but left unsigned by 
the Weber County Attorney. 
On June 27, 1986, an application for an Ex Parte Order 
authorizing the extension of time was made by William F. Daines, 
Deputy County Attorney, Weber County, State of Utah, (Addendum 
#4). This application does not specify that Mr. Daines was a 
Deputy County Attorney specifically designated by the County 
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Attorney for purposes of §77-23a-8, Utah Code Annotated (1980), 
as that section existed at the time of this application. The 
Affidavit attached to the Order indicates that results thus far 
obtained from the first interception were unproductive as a 
result of the Appellant's absence from town during that period of 
time. All information contained in the Affidavit submitted by 
Mr. Daines and the police officer was obtained as a direct result 
of the Court's Order dated, but left unsigned, May 23, 1986. 
Subsequently, the Court granted a seven day extension of the tel-
ecommunications intercept. 
Based upon information accumulated during the period of 
time which covered the Orders authorizing interception of 
wirecommunications to and from the Appellant's phone, police 
officers approached the Circuit Court Judge, Brent West, and 
secured a Search Warrant for the Appellant's automobiles. (T.T. @ 
pg. 27). On or about August 9, 1986, the Search Warrant was exe-
cuted and, pursuant thereto, Appellant's house and vehicles were 
searched. Personal property and cocaine were seized as a result 
of the search. Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged 
with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute for value. 
On February 19, 1987, the matter came on for trial 
before the Honorable David E. Roth, one of the Judges of the 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
State of Utah vs. David Hunt 
Page Three 
Second Judicial District, sitting without a jury. Defense coun-
sel realized that the initial authorization for the telephonic 
communication intercept had not been signed by the County 
Attorney until approximately two months after the Order had been 
signed by Judge Wahlquist, and pursuant to a Nunc Pro Tunc Order. 
(T.T. @ pgs. 36 & 40). A Deputy County Attorney then brought to 
the attention of the Court that no pre trial motion under Rule 
12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, had been filed with regards 
to the application. (T.T. @ pg 36). Defense counsel objected to 
the admission of any.information pursuant to the Order on the 
grounds that the initial thirty days of the tap was simply 
inadmissible. He indicated that he did not know whether or not 
the Motion Nunc Pro Tunc would rectify something of this nature, 
i.e. whether or not it could validate Judge Wahlquist's Order if, 
in fact, signed two months after instituting said Order, but sim-
ply objected to the admissibility of any evidence pursuant to 
that Order. Defense counsel had filed a Motion to Suppress the 
day before the trial on the matter. He filed absolutely no sup-
pression motions under the requirements of the Telephonic 
Interception Of Communications Act ten days prior to trial on the 
matter. 
When trial on the matter commenced, defense counsel had 
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no authority for his position that the initial wire tap Order was 
ineffective as a result of the County Attorney's failure to sign 
same. (T.T. @ pg 38). He had not researched the issue even 
though he had a copy of the Order for some time prior to trial. 
The State, on the other hand, argued to the Court that they had a 
plethoria of cases that indicated that it was okay if the 
County Attorney did not sign the Application. Defense counsel 
had no authority nor did defense counsel object to the 
admissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to the second 
warrant authorized and applied for by William Daines, Deputy 
County Attorney. 
Judge Roth denied the Defendant's Motion finding that 
the failure to timely sign the Application was not fatal to the 
warrant. (T.T. @ pg 41). The trial Judge made no finding as to 
whether or not Mr. Daines was a duly authorized Deputy County 
Attorney specifically designated by the County Attorney to make 
an Application for a wire tap interception order. Subsequently, 
the Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute for value. The Defendant was sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate amount of time of one to fif-
teen years. Defense counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on behalf 
nf fh^ npfemdant. but failed to Droceed with the Appeal. The 
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Appeal was dismissed June 1, 1987, and returned to the District 
Court for failure to prosecute. Following a Habeas Corpus action 
in Third District Court, the matter was remanded back to Judge 
Roth for resentencing in order to permit Appellant the 
opportunity to exercise his constitutional and statutory right to 
Appeal. His Notice Of Appeal was subsequently filed June 6, 
1988, and Appellant was released from the Utah State Prison fol-
lowing Judge Roth's approval of a certificate of probable cause. 
Appellant thus far has spent more than fourteen months in the 
Utah State Prison. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Defendant's conviction on October 5, 1989. The opinion is 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. The 
Appellant was granted a thirty day extension of time during which 
to file his Petition For Writ Of Certiorari. The Utah Court of 
Appeals stayed remitture in this matter pending the Supreme 
Courts determination of the Appellant's Petition For Writ. The 
Order is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial Court errored in denying Appellant's Motion To 
Suppress All Evidence seized pursuant to the Search Warrant 
executed August 9, 1986. The County Attorney's failure to 
properly apply for a wire tap Order made said Order defective on 
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its face, even in light of the Nunc Pro Tunc Order entered two 
months after the fact. The initial application for Wire Tap 
Order was not executed properly and the subsequent application 
for an extension of that Order had not been authorized by a 
Deputy County Attorney "specifically designated" by the County 
Attorney to make said applications. Finally, Appellant was 
denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when his 
trial attorney failed to adequately represent the issues sur-
rounding the telecommunications interceptions during the trial on 
the matter and by failing to properly file a Motion To Suppress 
evidence seized pursuant to a Telecommunications Order under the 
Telecommunications Act requiring that said Motion be made at 
least ten days prior to trial and articulating that the reasons 
made for said Motion were the fact that the Deputy County 
Attorney was not duly authorized by the County Attorney to make 
said application within the four corners of the document pre-
sented to the Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY FAILED TO PROPERLY AUTHORIZE 
THE ORIGINAL APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER PERMITTING INTER-
CEPTION OF APPELLANT'S WIRE AND ORAL COMMUNICATIONS IN 
VIOLATION OF §77-233-8, U.C-A. (1980). FURTHER, THE 
ORDER PURPORTED TO AUTHORIZE INTERCEPTION FOR A PERIOD 
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OF TIME IN EXCESS OF THAT SUBMITTED BY THE ACT, VOIDING 
THE ORDER. 
The Utah Interception Communications Act, U.C.A. 
§77-23a-l through 16, as well as its federal counterpart, Title 
III of the Ominibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
18 U.S.C. §2510 to 2520, set forth the procedures for authorizing 
and approving the interception of wire communications. 
§77-23a-8, which was in existence at the time of Appellant's 
trial, authorized the County Attorneys or any Deputy County 
Attorney specially designated by the County Attorney to authorize 
an application for 3 wire or oral telecommunications intercept 
order. 
The Utah Code requires the government to comply with the 
required application procedures or evidence obtained as a result 
of such surveillance must be suppressed at the criminal trial. 
As the United States Senate reported at the 113th Congressional 
Record 21861, concerning Title III, the Act 
...Centeralizes in a publicly responsible official sub-
ject to the political process the formulation of law 
enforcement policy to be used as electronic surveillance 
techniques. Centralization will avoid the possibility 
that divergent practices might develope. Should abuses 
occur, the lines of responsibility lead to an identifia-
ble person. This provision in itself should go a long 
way in guaranteeing that no abuses will happen. S.Rep. 
1097, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 96 through 97 (1968). 
The procedures followed in securing Court authorization 
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to intercept Appellant's telephone communications did not rise to 
the level of conformity manditated by Title III, the United 
States Supreme Court's interpretation thereof, nor the Utah 
Interceptions Act, hereinafter referred to as "The Act". The 
level of compliance obtained by the Weber County Attorney's 
Office in this case falls far below that required by the Act and 
contemplated by Congress when it passed Title III. 
In 1980, §77-23a-8, U.C.A. (1980), clearly required the 
County Attorney or a specially designated Deputy County Attorney 
to authorize the application for an Order permitting 
interception. In the case at hand, the County Attorney himself 
made the application, entitled Application. He did not sign it 
even though it was notarized. 
§77-23a-10 (1) (1982) required that the application for 
an intercept order be in writing: 
Each application for an Order authorizing or approving 
the interception of wire or oral communications shall be 
made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a Judge of 
competent jurisdiction, and shall state the applicants 
authority to make the application.... 
Even though federal law holds that personal approval, or 
approval in fact, by the Attorney General of an application for 
an intercept order, overcomes facial insufficiencies because of 
incorrect signatures or the misidentification of the authorized 
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Attorney General, the Act clearly speaks for itself. An applica-
tion shall be made in writing upon oath. Clearly Mr. Hughes did 
not sign his application under oath. This is not a case of 
misidentification or incorrect signatures. This is a case where 
the application is completely devoid of the signature. The Court 
of Appeals seems to overlook the problem that Mr. Hughes himself 
made application to the Court, as opposed to a police officer 
making application. The statute does not permit the County 
Attorney to simply authorize and then submit an unsigned, unsworn 
to application to the District Court Judge. The statute is very 
specific in requiring a writing upon oath or affirmation. 
The Court of Appeals cites U.S. vs. Chavez, 416 U.S. 
562 (1974), for the proposition that so long as the County 
Attorney is the official who authorized the application, someone 
else may sign the application. There was never any allegation 
made in U.S. vs. Chavez that the statutory requirement that the 
application be made in writing, under oath was ignored. To 
require anything less than a sworn writing as required by the 
statute would effectively destroy the requirement of authoriza-
tion as it existed in 1980 and provide a convenient means to 
escape public accountability. If the County Attorney decided to 
actually make application instead of simply authorize the 
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application, it stands to reason that he should be held to the 
strict requirements of the statute. 
The state's attorney argued, during Appellant's trial, 
that the Nunc Pro Tunc Order corrected the defective application, 
and so held Judge Roth. (T.T. @ pg 41). A decree Nunc Pro Tunc, 
however, is to record judicial action taken and not to remedy 
inaction. Bruce vs. Bruce, 4 Wash. 2nd 635, 296 P.2d 310. 
According to the Court in State vs. Ryan, 146 Wash. 114, 161 P 
775, "it may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not 
to make it speak what it did not speak". It cannot, two months 
after the fact, heal.an otherwise fatal application for a tele-
communications intercept order. Again, I emphasize the fact that 
the County Attorney did not merely authorize the telecommunica-
tions intercept order in this case, he actually made application 
for that order himself. 
The Order signed on May 23, 1986, was not only based 
upon writings representing procedural defects effecting the sub-
stantive rights of the Defendant, but it was facially void. 
§77-23a-10 (5) provides: 
No order entered under this section may authorize or 
approve the interception of any wire or oral communica-
tions for any period longer than is necessary to achieve 
the objective of the authorization, nor in any event 
longer than thirty days. 
The May 23, 1986 order provides: 
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This order authorizing the interception of telephonic 
communications upon the initial receipt of incriminating 
conversations but shall continue until enough evidence 
is obtained to accomplish the objectives herein stated, 
but in no event shall the authorization to intercept 
communications extend longer than thirty days past 0700 
hours June 28, 1986, unless a specific extension is 
granted by the Court that this is a continuing criminal 
enterprise and that there is probable cause to believe 
that the communications ought to be intercepted will 
continue after the initial period of authorized 
interception. (emphasis added) 
Likewise, the second order permitting interception 
states: 
...But in no event shall the authorization extend longer 
than the thirty day extension, past 0700 hours July 27, 
1986... 
Clearly the Order purports to authorize wire communica-
tions interception for a period in excess of thirty days and is 
void on its face. Evidence obtained pursuant to the order and 
the June 27, 1986 order must be suppressed. If Defendant's trial 
counsel had made himself aware of the statutory manditates with 
regards to Title III and the Utah Interception Act, evidence 
obtained as a result of the void orders would have been sup-
pressed by the trial Court. There can be no doubt that the 
Defendant was prejudiced by the failure of due diligence on 
defense counsel's part. 
POINT II 
THE JUNE 27, 1986 APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING 
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THE EXTENSION OF TIME FOR INTERCEPTION OF APPELLANT'S 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY A DEPUTY COUNTY 
ATTORNEY SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
AS WAS REQUIRED BY §77-23a-8, U.C.A. (1980). 
On June 27, 1986, William Daines, Deputy County 
Attorney, applied for an Order extending the time during which 
the State could intercept Appellant's telecommunications. The 
application nowhere indicates that Mr. Daines was the Deputy 
County Attorney specially designated to authorize an application, 
nor to make an application for an intercept order at all. 
The Court of Appeals, at pg 6 of its opinion attached 
hereto, states that "the application is, nevertheless, valid. 
Defendant is merely making a Semitic distinction between spe-
cially designated and duly authorized". The application 
indicates that Mr. Daines is a duly authorized County Attorney. 
This does not meet the requirements of the statute insofar as it 
does not indicate that he was specifically designated by the 
County Attorney to make applications. That was a statutory 
requirement at the time and was inserted into the statutory, 
scheem so that each application for an intercept order may be 
passed upon by one of the highest law enforcement officials in 
government, and it named them. Congress and the legislature 
expected them to exercise personal judgment, before approving any 
applications. Routine processing by subornates was not to be the 
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approach. More responsibility than that which devolves upon any 
department head in any bureaucracy, that is, ultimate responsi-
bility for what subornates do, was required. It would subvert 
the congressional scheme if we were to sanction anything less 
that strict compliance, much less the gross departure that has 
taken place in this case. As the Court of Appeals points out, 
the statute has since been amended to permit any County Attorney 
to make application for a wire tap intercept. However, this was 
not the case at the time of Appellant's trial on the matter. 
The authorization requirements provided for in The Act 
were not mere technicalities; they were at the heart of the leg-
islative scheme. 
In U.S. vs. Giordlano, 94 S. Ct. 1823, an Assistant 
United States Attorney, Brocoto, submitted an application to a 
federal judge for an order permitting interception of the commu-
nications of Giordiano. The application recited that Assistant 
Attorney General Will Wilson had been specially designated by the 
Attorney General to authorize the application. Attached to the 
application was a letter from Mr. Wilson to Brocoto stating that 
Wilson had reviewed the request for authorization, and had made 
the necessary probable cause determination and then purported to 
authorize Brocoto to proceed with the application to the Court. 
Upon reviewing the application, the Judge issued an order author-
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izing the interception "pursuant to application authorized by the 
Assistant Attorney General...Will Wilson, specifically designated 
by the Attorney General...". Glordiano at 94 Supreme Court 1823 
and 1824. 
It developed during Suppression Hearing that the appli-
cation for interception authority had inaccurately described the 
officials who had authorized the application. Rather than Wilson 
having personally authorized the application, the executive 
assistant to the Attorney General reviewed the request for 
authorization and had concluded, from his "knowledge of the 
Attorney General's auctions on previous cases, he would approve 
the request if submitted to him". Thus, the executive caused the 
Attorney General's initials to be placed on the Memorandum to 
Wilson instructing him to authorize Brocoto to proceed. Further, 
Wilson did not himself sign either of the letters bearing his 
name accompanying the applications to the District Court. 
Although the scenario of the instant case differed some-
what from the factual background of Giordiano, a reading of the 
documents contained in the Addendum discloses similar procedural 
irregularities. First of all, the County Attorney choose to make 
the initial application to Judge Walhquist for a wire tap order 
as opposed to "authorizing" him, or an investigative or law 
enforcement officer to make the application. The application 
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made by Hughes should have been signed and a Motion Nunc Pro Tunc 
simply could not cure the defect. Mr. Hughes went a step beyond 
authorization insofar as he actually made the application himself 
and did not bother to sign or execute it himself prior to entry 
of the order. Strict compliance is a procedural requirement 
manditated by The Act and does not permit this kind of haphazard 
behavior in securing Court Orders. As stated in Giordiano at 94 
Supreme Court 1827, 
Investigative personnel may not themselves ask the Judge 
for authority to wire tap or eavesdrop. A mature judg-
ment of a particular, responsible....official is inter-
posed as a critical pre-condition to any judicial order, 
(emphasis added). 
Secondly a Deputy County Attorney attempted to make an 
application to the District Court for an order authorizing an 
extension of the May 2 3rd wire tap order. Mr. Daines indicated 
in his signed Affidavit that he was a Deputy County Attorney, had 
read the Affidavit of the police officer and believed the infor-
mation contained in the application police officers affidavit to 
be true. Nowhere in his application does he allege that he was 
specially designated by the County Attorney to authorize an 
application, much less make an application himself. 
This is precisely the type of situation contemplated by 
law makers prior to enactment of act of Title III and the Utah 
Act. The legislative history outlined in Giodiano supports this 
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view. The Act provides assurance of a reasonable executive 
determination of the need and justifiability of each interception 
and, it is clear that the authority must be exercised before the 
underlined application is presented to a Judge. 
As to any affidavits submitted to the Court after the 
Wire Tap Orders were signed, the Giodiano Court stated in 
Footnote 12 @ 74 S. Ct. 1830: 
It would ill serve the Congressional policy of having 
the Attorney General or one of his assistants screen the 
applications prior to their submission to the Court to 
have the screening process occur after the application 
is made and after investigative officials have already 
begun to intercept wire or oral communications under a 
Court Order predicated on the assumption that proper 
authorization to apply for the intercept authority had 
been given. 
POINT III 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INTERCEPT ORDERS AND CONSEQUENTLY EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A 
RESULT OF EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT BASED UPON 
INFORMATION OBTAINED DIRECTLY THEREFROM, MUST BE SUP-
PRESSED PURSUANT TO §77-23a-7 AND §77-23a-10 (8), U.C.A. 
(1980). 
Because the initial application for an intercept order 
was not executed in accordance with statutory requirements and 
because the approval of a Deputy County Attorney of the June 27th 
application does not comply with statutory requirements, the evi-
dence obtained from the interceptions should have been suppressed 
and could not serve as a basis for probable cause in securing a 
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subsequent search warrant of Appellant's house. 
§77-23a-7 provides that no part of the contents of any 
wire or oral communication, and no evidence derived therefrom, 
may be received from any proceeding in or before any Court or 
other authority of this state, 
If disclosure of that information would be in violation 
of this chapter. 
What disclosures are forbidden, and are subject to Motions To 
Suppress, is in turn governed by §77-23a-10 (10)(a), U.C.A. 
(1980), which provides for suppression of evidence on the follow-
ing grounds: 
1. The communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
The communications the government offered in support of 
the search warrant signed by Judge West for unlawfully inter-
cepted within the meaning of paragraph l above, because the ini-
tial application for the intercept order was not executed prior 
to the entry of the order and because the application for exten-
sion of time during which to intercept Appellant's communication 
was not authorized by a Deputy County Attorney specially desig-
nated by the County Attorney to authorize the application or to 
make application himself. 
Even though use of communications intercepted as a 
result of either order which I have hereintofore referred may 
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result in Constitutional violations, the words "unlawfully 
intercepted" are themselves not limited to Constitutional 
violations. Congress intended to require suppression where there 
is failure to satisfy any of the statutory requirements that 
directly and substantially implement the Congressional intention 
to limit the use of wire tap orders. Giordlano @ 94 S. Ct. 1832. 
We are confident that the provisions for pre application 
approval was intended to play a central role in the 
statutory scheme and that suppression must follow when 
it is shown that this statutory requirement has been 
ignored, i.d. @ 1832. (emphasis added). 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND §12 ARTICLE 1 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. APPELLANT WAS DENIED 
HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING THE 
DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS UPON WHICH THIS APPEAL IS 
BASED. 
The Utah Telecommunications Statute requires a motion to 
suppress pursuant to that statute to be filed ten days prior to 
the date of trial. Defense counsel in this case filed a General 
Motion To Suppress only two days before Appellant's trial and 
failed to include in that Motion the precise grounds concerning 
the application and authorization requirements raised by 
Appellant on appeal. Instead, defense counsel apparently decided 
to* "wing it" by bringing procedural irregularities before the 
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Court during Appellant's trial. Defense counsel totally failed 
to recognize the fact that Mr. Daines was not specifically desig-
nated by the County Attorney to make application for the exten-
sion order of June 1987. Defense counsel rendered a deficit 
performance and the outcome of the trial would definitely have 
been different but for counsel's error. Trial counsel's failure 
to articulate the problems with the State's application and 
authorizations was clearly not discretionary. His position as 
the attorney created duties incident thereto and demanded that he 
make the necessary inquiries into the State's case. Here, that 
case rested almost inclusively on telecommunication 
interceptions. It was incumbent upon defense counsel to bring to 
the attention of the State and to the Court the deficiencies so 
obvious in the application in support of the orders for intercep-
tion of Appellant's communications. After all, those communica-
tions served as the exclusive source of information in support of 
the search warrant. 
Although defense counsel apparently recognized some 
problems with the application procedure, his recognition was evi-
dently a new discovery and he was ill prepared to argue the 
issues. (T.T. @ pgs. 38 through 41). 
Although the Court of Appeals recognized that defense 
counsel filed a timely Motion To Suppress on the grounds that the 
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probable cause statement was insufficient to support the search 
warrant, the Court failed to recognize that pursuant to the 
Interceptions Act, a Suppression Motion must be filed at least 
ten days prior to the time of trial. Additionally, the Court 
indicates that defense counsel objected, at length, to the suffi-
ciency of the probable cause statement. That is simply not 
Appellant's argument on Appeal. Appellant's argument on Appeal 
is defense counsels total lack of knowledge of the telecommunica-
tions statute and his ability to deal with the suppression issues 
arising therefrom at a Suppression Hearing which should have 
been heard prior to the day of trial. Additionally, the defense 
counsel's complete failure to raise the issue of whether or not 
Mr. Daines was specially designated by the County Attorney to 
make application and give authorization for the June Order was 
never brought to the attention of the Court. Even though this 
issue was raised for the first time on Appeal, it was raised 
under exceptional circumstances insofar as the Appellant's right 
to effective assistance of counsel is concerned. This is not a 
case where the trial counsel consciously choose a strategy that 
differs from that which Appellant's counsel thinks might have 
succeeded below, as was the case in State vs. Bullock, 119 Utah 
Adv. Rep. In this case, the trial Court committed plain error in 
admitting the evidence obtained as a direct result of a void tel-
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ecommunications order and trial counsel was ineffective in fail-
ing to raise that objection to the trial Court. The Appellant 
does not have the space herein in order to provide the Court with 
the fully briefed issues of harmful error and that the trial 
Court's ruling was plainly erroneous. He would appreciate an 
opportunity to brief these issues to the Utah Supreme Court as a 
result of a grant of this Petition. Appellant would like the 
Supreme Court to assure that justice is done, even if trial coun-
sel failed to act to bring a harmfully erroneously ruling to the 
attention of the trial Court. This is not a case, as was in 
Bullock, where a party, through counsel, made a conscious deci-
sion to refrain from objecting or lead the trial Court into 
error. Appellant asks that this Court balance the need for pro-
cedural regularities with the demands of fairness and grant 
Appellant's Petition. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ v" day of November, 
1989. 
RANDINE SALERNO 
Attorney at Law 
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DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Defendant Davijd J. Hunt appeals from a bench trial conviction 
for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
for value. Defendant argues on appeal that the failure of the 
county attorney to sign the application for an intercept order 
invalidated the application, and therefore, the evidence obtained 
pursuant to the order should be suppressed. We affirm, 
FACTS 
On May 23, 1986, Weber County Attorney Donald C. Hughes, Jr. 
filed an application for an order to intercept wire 
communications from Hunt's residence. The application was 
supported by an affidavit signed by Sergeant Glen Warner, naming 
defendant as the main person involved in a drug organization that 
purchases and transports cocaine to suppliers along the Wasatch 
Front. Hughes inadvertently failed to sign the application. The 
omission was not initially noticed and Judge Wahlquist signed the 
order authorizing interception of defendant's wire 
communications from May 29, 1986 through June 28, 1986. During 
that month, however, defendant left Salt Lake City and lived in 
California. 
On June 27, 1986, Deputy Weber County Attorney William F. 
Daines applied for an extension of the intercept order. 
Attached to the application was an affidavit submitted by 
Sergeant Warner setting forth the results of the first 
intercept. Judge Wahlquist granted a thirty-day extension, 
from June 28, 1986, through July 27, 1986. 
On July 26, 1986, Daines applied for a second extension of 
the intercept order from July 27, 1986 through August 3, 1986. 
While preparing that application, Daines discovered the 
omission of Hughes's signature on the original application. 
Hughes filed a motion nunc pro tunc to execute the original 
application. Judge Wahlquist granted the nunc pro tunc order 
making the execution of the original application effective May 
23, 1986, and signed the order for the second extension of the 
intercept. The interception of defendant's wire communications 
ceased on August 3, 1986. 
Based on the information gathered from the interception of 
defendant's wire communications, the police learned that a 
large drug transaction was about to take place between 
defendant and another person in Vista, California. On August 
5, 1986, defendant placed a call to the other person and 
immediately left for California. Detectives in California 
informed the Utah police of defendant's arrival at the Vista 
residence. 
On August 8, 1986, defendant drove back to Utah followed by 
four police cars and a police helicopter. The police obtained 
a search warrant for defendant's home and vehicles and on 
August 9, 1986, conducted a search. Thirty-four items of 
personal property were seized including one pound of cocaine, 
scales, scale weights, and a cocaine screen. Defendant was 
arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with the intent 
to distribute for value. 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress all evidence 
seized as a result of the search of his home and vehicles 
challenging the sufficiency of the probable cause statements in 
support of the search warrant. The motion was denied and a 
bench trial was held. Defendant's trial counsel objected at 
trial to the admission of any evidence obtained as a result of 
the intercept orders because they were not properly executed. 
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The judge ruled that the omission of the signature was not 
fatal to the order and that the nunc pro tunc order remedied 
any error. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to prison. 
On May 29, 1988, Hughes filed a belated affidavit 
establishing his authorization of the application for the 
intercept order and his special designation of Daines as being 
"duly authorized," pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8 
(1982). 
Defendant argues on appeal that the failure of the county 
attorney to sign the original application for the intercept 
order could not be remedied nunc pro tunc and that the order 
purported to authorize interception for a period in excess of 
that permitted by section 77-23a-10 (1982). Defendant also 
argues that the deputy county attorney was not "specially 
designated- pursuant to section 77-23a-8 to apply for the 
extensions. Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance because these objections were 
not timely made. 
AUTHORIZATION FOR AN INTERCEPT ORDER 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to -2520, provides the framework for 
the Utah Interception of Communications Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 77-23a-l to -16 (Supp. 1989).1 The Utah Act, as well as 
its federal counterpart, set forth the procedure for 
authorizing and approving the interception of wire 
communications. The version of section 77-23a-8, which was in 
effect at the time of trial, authorized the county attorney or 
any deputy county attorney, "specially designated" by the 
county attorney, to authorize an application for an intercept 
order.2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10(l) (1982) requires that 
an application for an intercept order be in writing: 
1. Since the time of trial in this matter, the Utah Interception 
of Communications Act was amended by the legislature in both 1988 
and 1989. 
2. The 1989 amendment eliminated the "special designation" 
requirement. County attorneys are no longer required to 
"specially designate" deputy county attorneys to authorize 
applications for wire interceptions. The 1989 amendment now 
authorizes any deputy county attorney to authorize wire 
communications interceptions without first obtaining county 
attorney approval. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8(l) (Supp. 1989). 
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Each application for an order authorizing 
or approving the interception of wire or 
oral communication shall be made in 
writing upon oath or affirmation to a 
judge of competent jurisdiction, and shall 
state the applicants authority to make 
the application . . . .3 
Defendant does not take issue with whether the application 
properly complied with the substantive requirements of section 
77-23a-10(l), but claims that the omission of the county 
attorney's signature invalidated the application. 
Federal case law holds that personal approval, or approval in 
fact, by the Attorney General of an application for an intercept 
order, overcomes facial insufficiencies because of incorrect 
signatures or the misidentification of the authorizing attorney 
general.4 The test is whether the deficiencies are of the type 
which "require suppression where there is failure to satisfy any 
of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially 
implement the congressional intention to limit the use of 
intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the 
employment of this extraordinary investigative device." United 
States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting 
United States v. Giondeno, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974)). 
3. The 1988 amendment to section 77-23a-10(l) inserted 
"electronic" following "wire" throughout the entire section. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10 (Supp. 1988). The legislature, in 
1989, also amended section 77-23a-10 but none of those changes 
affect this appeal. 
4. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United States 
v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 859 (1st Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("The 
absence of a compelling signature on a critical document can be 
remedied by proof of actual authority."); United States v. 
Lawson, 545 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Thomas, 
508 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975); 
United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(misidentifying assistant attorney general as authorizing person 
does not render interceptions unlawful); United States v. Cox, 
462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bowdach, 366 F. 
Supp. 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1973); and United States v. Schullo, 363 F. 
Supp. 246, 253 (D. Minn. 1973) ("[0]nce the Attorney General 
himself has approved an application for electronic surveillance, 
further ministerial acts are unimportant."). 
A 
The United States Supreme Court# in United States v. 
Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974), decided whether it was appropriate 
to suppress evidence where statutory application procedures for 
an intercept order were not fully satisfied. In Chavez, the 
application and court order incorrectly identified the 
Assistant Attorney General as the authorizing official. 
Despite this procedural violation, the Supreme Court determined 
that the Attorney General had in fact authorized the 
application. The Court held that since there was not a claim 
of any constitutional infirmity arising from the defect, Mit 
does not follow that because of this deficiency in reporting, 
evidence obtained pursuant to the order may not be used at a 
trial of respondents." I£. at 570. See £l££ United States v. 
Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. at 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (congressional 
scheme not violated where deputy attorney general signed order 
when attorney general had in fact approved the order). The 
Court distinguished its holding in Giordano by stating, "we did 
not go so far as to suggest that every failure to comply with 
any requirement provided in Title III would render the 
interception of wire or oral communications •unlawful.1" 
Chavez, 416 U.S. at 574-75. 
In determining whether technical violations rise to the 
level of constitutional infirmities, consideration of the 
rationale behind the procedural requirements in the Utah Act is 
important. Section 2518 of Title III, comparable to section 
77-23a-10 of the Utah Act, "was designed to affix the lines of 
responsibility as a corollary to promoting a uniform policy in 
wire interception." Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. at 1373. 
"[A]lthough considerations of centralization and uniformity of 
decision-making are adjuncts to the protection of privacy, 
those considerations do not reach the level of constitutional 
status." !£. The purpose behind section 2516 of Title III, 
comparable to section 77-23a-8, requiring identification of the 
authorizing official in the application, "facilitates the 
court's ability to conclude that the application has been 
properly approved," and also fixes responsibility for the 
source of preliminary approval. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 575. 
Defendant argues that to require anything less than a sworn 
writing would effectively destroy the requirement of 
authorization and provide a convenient means to escape public 
accountability. However, there was ample evidence to show that 
Hughes did in fact approve the application for the intercept 
order, and is clearly accountable for such authorization. The 
application identified Hughes numerous times as the one 
authorizing the application and he submitted an affidavit 
attesting to the fact that he approved the applications. By 
o o n o o r r** «; 
inadvertently omitting his signature# Hughes did not compromise 
the privacy of wire and oral communications as provided in 
section 77-23a-2 (1982)• 
"SPECIALLY DESIGNATED" DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Defendant contends that the applications for extensions of 
time for the interceptions were not authorized by a "deputy 
county attorney specially designated by the county attorney" in 
accordance with section 77-23a-8 (1982): 
[A]ny county attorney or any deputy county 
attorney specially designated by the 
county attorney, may authorize an 
application to a Utah State district court 
judge of competent jurisdiction for, and 
the judge may grant • . . an order 
authorizing or approving the interception 
of a wire or oral communication • • • . 
(emphasis added,)5 
This issue is raised for the first time on appeal and "[i]n 
the absence of exceptional circumstances, [Utah appellate 
courts have] long refused to review matters raised for the 
first time on appeal where no timely and proper objection was 
made in the trial court." State v. Loe. 732 P.2d 115, 117 
(Utah 1987). Even if this issue had been raised below, the 
application is, nevertheless, valid. Defendant is merely 
making a semantic distinction between "specially designated" 
and "duly authorized." The application for the extension 
stated that Deputy County Attorney William F. Daines is "duly 
5. The amended portion of section 77-23a-8 currently appears as 
follows: 
The attorney general of the state or any 
assistant attorney general, or any county 
attorney or deputy county attorney may 
authorize an application to a judge of 
competent jurisdiction for an order for an 
interception of wire, electronic, or oral 
communications. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8 (Supp. 1989). 
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authorized by Donald C. Hughes, Weber County Attorney, to make 
this application." In light of the foregoing analysis, this 
distinction is meritless. 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant finally claims ineffective assistance of 
counsel. In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the 
defendant's burden to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that 
the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but 
for counselfs error.- State v. Gearv, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 
1985). &££ fllSQ Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). Failure to show either deficient performance or 
resulting prejudice will defeat a claim of ineffective 
counsel. Geary, 707 P.2d at 646. The Utah Supreme Court 
recently applied the Strickland test in State v. Archuleta, 747 
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987): 
Before this Court will consider whether 
specific conduct falls below the required 
standard of objective reasonableness, the 
person arguing ineffective assistance must 
show that the conduct prejudiced his case. 
. . . (citations omitted). In order to 
prove prejudice to his case, "defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Xfi. at 1023 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for the following reasons: (1) he failed to file a timely 
motion to suppress certain incriminating evidence; (2) he 
failed to object to the sufficiency of the probable cause 
statement in support of the search warrant; (3) he failed to 
object to the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the 
intercept order; and (4) he failed to articulate and support 
his objection to certain evidence. 
Defendant's first two claims are inconsistent with the 
trial record as it appears before us. Trial counsel filed a 
timely motion to suppress on the ground that the probable cause 
statement was insufficient to support the search warrant. At 
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trial, counsel also objected, at length, to the sufficiency of 
the probable cause statement. Both the motion and the 
objections were denied. We defer to trial counselfs 
professional judgment and trial strategy in not pursuing this 
line of objection. See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 
(Utah 1987). "Decisions as to what witnesses to call, what 
objections to make, and, by and large, what defenses to 
interpose, are generally left to the professional judgment of 
counsel." State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982), cert. 
a£ni£ll, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). 
We are not persuaded that defendant's trial counsel was 
ineffective. Even if all of defendant's claims were true, we 
are not persuaded that the outcome would have been different. 
The governing legal standard plays a 
critical role in defining the question to 
be asked in assessing the prejudice from 
counsel's errors. When a defendant 
challenges a conviction, the question is 
whether there is a reasonable probability 
that, absent the errors, the fact finder 
would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt. 
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 695. 
The trial court found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The evidence amply supports this finding. 
/ ^ /? 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
/•••- ..*•* r^ * 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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77-23-5 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 194 
n o t The magistrate may direct that specific 
awoixfcaadfl* 6* m*d* ca du mumat Zfpoa ^ 
proval, the magistrate shall direct the law
 %n. 
forcement officer or the prosecuting attorney f^ .' 
the government who ia requesting the warrant to 
sign the magistrate's name on the warrant TJyg 
warrant shall be called a duplicate original w^. 
rant and shall be deemed a warrant for purpo^g 
of this chapter. In such cases the magistrate ah j^i 
cause to be made an original warrant. The rn^g. 
iatrate shall enter the exact time of issuance
 0f 
the duplicate original warrant on the face of the 
original warrant. 
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant *\nd 
the original warrant shall be in conformity w ^ 
this chapter. Upon return, the magistrate sh^jj 
require the person who gave the sworn oral t e ^ . 
mony establishing the grounds for issuance of the 
warrant to sign a copy of the transcript. 
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate sh^ji 
issue a search warrant lego 
77*23-6. Time for service — Officer may requ*gt 
assistance. " 
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in the 
warrant that it be served in the daytime, unless the 
affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable ca\U6 
U> h§jj#y» j search is nerwsaary m the mjht tc a*^ 
the property pnor to it being concealed, destroy^ 
damaged or altered, or for other good reason; m w h ^ 
case he may insert a direction that it be served a^y 
time of the day or night An officer may request ott\er 
persons to assist him in conducting the search. 
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten 
days from the date of issuance. Any search warr^nt 
not executed within such tune shall be void and shell 
be returned to the court or magistrate as not e ^ 
cuted. i|eo 
77-23-6. Receipt for property taken. 
When the officer seizes property pursuant to
 a 
aearch warrant te shall give a receipt to the p e r ^ 
from whom it was seized or in whoee possession it *vM 
found. If no person is present the officer shall le^ve 
the receipt in the place where he found the property 
Failure to give or leave a receipt shall not render ^ e 
evidence seized inadmissible at trial. xmo 
77*23-7. Return — Inventory of property takt^ 
The officer, after execution of the warrant sh^u 
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to \^t 
magistrate and deliver a written inventory of a^v. 
thing seised, stating the place where it is being h ^ 
*sso 
77*23-6. Safekeeping of property. 
l b s officer seizing the property shall be responsible 
for its safekeeping and maintenance until the coi^ 
otherwise orders. lgeo 
77-23-9. Return of papers to district court 
The magistrate shall annex to the depositions an(j 
affidavits upon which the search warrant is based t^c 
search warrant the return, and the inventory, hopW. 
ever, if he is without authority to proceed funl ler 
with respect to the offense under which the warr«\nt 
was issued, he shall return them to the appropni^ 
court of the county having jurisdiction within 15 d\va 
after the return. i M 
77-23-10. Force uaed in executing warrant _ 
Notice of authority prerequisite, w h ^ 
When a search warrant has been issued authoi^! 
ing entry into any building, room, conveyance, «\m . 
partznent or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
wamnt may am mich m m as is reaaonao/v nsces-
aary to enter 
(1) If, after notice of his authority and purpose, 
there is no response or he is not admitted with 
reasonable promptness; or 
(2) Without notice of his authority and pur* 
pose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant di-
rects in the warrant that the officer need not give 
notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon 
proof, under oath, that the object of the search 
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or se-
creted, or that physical harm may result to any 
person if notice were given. lseo 
77-23-11. Violation of health, safety, building or 
animal cruelty laws or ordinances — 
Warrants to obtain evidence. 
In addition to other warrants provided by this 
chapter, magistrates, upon a showing of probable 
cause to believe a state, county, or city law, or ordi-
nance has been violated in relation to health, safety, 
building, or animal cruelty, may issue a warrant for 
the purpose of obtaining evidence of such violation. 
Such warrants may be obtained from a magistrate 
upon request of peace officers and state, county, and 
municipal health, firm, building, and animal control 
personnel on)? s/Ur MpprovwJ by g pnmtcuting sttor-
ney. A search warrant issued under this section shall 
be directed to any peace officer within the county 
where the warrant is to be executed, who shall serve 
the same. Other concerned personnel may accompany 
the officer. lseo 
77-23-12. Evidence seized pursuant to warrant 
not excluded unless unlawful aearch 
or seizure substantial — "Substantial" 
defined. 
Pursuant to the standards deecribed in Section 
77-36- 12(g) property or evidence seized pursuant to a 
search warrant shall not be suppressed at a motion, 
trial, or other proceeding unless the unlawful conduct 
of the peace officer is shown to be substantial. Any 
unlawful search or seizure shall be considered sub-
stantial and in bad faith if the warrant waa obtained 
with malicious purpose and without probable cause or 
was executed maliciously and willfully beyond the 
authority of the warrant or with unnecessary sever-
ity, lsas 
CHAPTER 23a 
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS 
Section 
77-23a-L Short title. 
77-23a-2. Legislative findings. 
77-23a-3. Definitions. 
77-23a-4. Offenses — Lawful interception. 
77-23a-5. Traffic in intercepting devices — Of-
fenses — Lawful activities. 
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77-23a.l. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Interception of Communications Act.** isso 
77-23a-2. Legislative findings. 
The legislature finds and determines that: 
(1) Wire communications are normally con-
ducted through facilities which form part of an 
interstate network. The same facilities are used 
for interstate and intrastate communications. 
(2) In order to protect effectively the privacy of 
wire and oral communications, to protect the in-
tegrity of court and administrative proceedings, 
and to prevent the obstruction of intrastate com* 
merce, it is necessary for the legislature to define 
the circumstances and conditions under which 
the interception of wire and oral communications 
may be authorized and to prohibit any unautho-
rized interception of these communications and 
the use of the contents thereof in evidence in 
courts and administrative proceedings. 
(3) Organized criminals make extensive use of 
wire and oral communications in their criminal 
activities. The interception of such communica-
tions to obtain evidence of the commission of 
crimes or to prevent their commission IB an indis-
pensable aid to law enforcement and the admin-
istration of justice. 
(4) TQ safeguard the privacy of innocent per-
sons, the interception of wire or oral communica-
tions when none of the parties to the communica-
tion has consented to the interception should be 
allowed only when authorized by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction and should remain under the 
control and supervision of the authorizing court. 
Interception of wire and oral communications 
should further be limited to certain major types 
of offenses and specific categories of crime with 
assurance that the interception is justified and 
that the information obtained thereby will not be 
misused. itso 
77-23a-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Aggrieved person" means a person who 
was a party to any intercepted wire, electronic, or 
oral communication, or a person against whom 
the interception was directed. 
(2) "Aural transfer" means any transfer con-
taining the human voice at any point between 
and including the point of origin and the point of 
reception. 
(3) "Communications common carrier" means 
any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, 
in intrastate, interstate, or foreign communica-
tion, by wire or radio, including a provider of 
electronic communication service, but s person 
engaged in radio broadcasting is not, when that 
person is so engaged, deemed a communications 
common carrier. 
(4) "Contents" when used with respect to any 
wire, electronic or oral communication, includes 
any information concerning the substance, pur-
port, or meaning of that communication. 
(5) "Electronic communication" means any 
transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, 
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature trans-
mitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, elec-
tromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical 
system, but does not include: 
(a) the radio portion of a cordless tele-
phone communication that is transmitted be-
tween the cordless telephone handset and 
the base unit; 
(b) any wire or oral communications; 
(c) any communication made through a 
tone only paging device; or 
(d) any communication from an electronic 
or mechanical device that permits the track-
ing of the movement of a person or object 
(6) "Electronic communications service" 
means any service that provides for users the 
ability to send or receive wire or electronic com-
munications. 
(7) "Electronic communications system" 
means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic or photo-optical facilities for the 
transmission of electronic communications, and 
any computer facilities or related electronic 
equipment for the electronic storage of the com-
municatioxL 
(8) "Electronic mechanical, or other device" 
means any device or apparatus that may be used 
to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communi-
cation other than: 
(a) any telephone or telegraph instru-
ment, equipment or facility, or any compo-
nent of them: 
(i) furnished to the subscriber or user 
by a provider of wire or electronic com-
munications service in the ordinary 
course of its business and being used by 
the subscriber or user in the ordinary 
course of its business; or 
(ii) being used by a provider of wire or 
electronic communications service in the 
ordinary course of its business, or by an 
investigative or law enforcement officer 
in the ordinary course of his duties; or 
(b) a hearing aid or similar device being 
used to correct subnormal hearing to not bet-
ter than normal. 
(9) "Electronic storage" means: 
(a) any temporary intermediate storage of 
a wire or electronic communication incident 
to the electronic transmission of it; and 
(b) any storage of the communication by 
an electronic communications service for the 
purposes of backup protection of the commu-
nication. 
(10) Intercept" means the aural acquisition of 
the contents of any wire, electronic or oral com-
munication through the use of any electronic 
marhsniral, or other device. 
(11) "Investigative or law enforcement officer" 
moans any officer of the state or a political subdi-
vision, who by law may conduct investigations o£ 
or make arrests for, offenses enumerated in this 
chapter, and any attorney authorised by law to 
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proeecute or participate in the proeecuUon of 
theae offenses. 
(12) kludge ofcompeUntjurismction" means a 
judge of a district court of the ftate. 
(13) "Oral communication" meana any oral 
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an 
expectation that the communication is not sub-
ject to interception, under circumstances justify-
ing that expectation, but does not include any 
electronic communication. 
(14) Ten register" means a device which 
records or decodes electronic or other impulses 
which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise 
transmitted on the telephone line to which the 
device is attached, but does not include any de-
vice used by a provider or customer of a wire or 
electronic communication service for billing, or 
recording aa an incident to billing, for communi-
cations services provided by the provider or any 
device used by a provider or customer of a wire 
communications service for cost accounting or 
other like purposes in the ordinary course of ita 
business. 
(15) Tenon" means any employee or agent of 
the state or a political subdivision, and any indi-
vidual, partnership, association, joint stock com-
pany, trust, or corporation. 
(16) "Readily accessible to the general public" 
means, regarding a radio communication, that 
the communication is not: 
(a) scrambled or encrypted; 
(b) transmitted using modulation tech-
niques whose essential parameters have 
been withheld from the public with the in-
tention of preserving the privacy of the com-
munication; 
(c) carried on a subcamer or signal sub-
sidiary to a radio transmission; 
(d) transmitted over a communications 
system provided by a common earner, unless 
the communication is a tone only paging sys-
tem communication; or 
(%) transmitted on frequencies allocated 
under Part 25, Subpart D, E, or F of Part 74, 
or Part 94, Rules of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, unless in the case of a 
communication transmitted on a frequency 
allocated under Part 74 that is not exclu-
sively allocated to broadcast auxiliary ser-
vice*, the communication is a two-way voice 
communication by radio. 
(17) Trap and trace device" means a device 
that captures the incoming electronic or other 
impulses that identify the originating number of 
an instrument or device from which a wire or 
electronic communication is transmitted. 
(18) 'User* means any person or entity who: 
(a) uses an electronic communications ser-
vice; and 
(b) is authorized by the provider of the ser-
vice to engage in the use. 
(19) (a) "Wire communication" means any au-
ral transfer communication made m whole 
or in part through the use of facilities for the 
transmission of communications by the aid 
of wire, cable, or other like connection be-
tween the point of origin and the point of 
reception furnished or operated by any per-
son engaged aa a common carrier in provid-
ing or operating these facilities for the trans-
mission of intrastate, interstate, or foreign 
communications. 
(b) "Wire communication'* does not in-
clude the radio portion of a cordless tele-
phone communication that is transmitted be-
tween the cordless telephone handset and 
the base unit teas 
77-23a-4. Offenaea — Lawful interception, 
(1) Except aa otherwise specifically provided in 
this chapter, any person who does any of the follow-
ing ia guilty of a felony of the third degree: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly intercept*, en-
deavors to intercept, or procures any other person 
to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, 
electronic, or oral communication; 
(b) intentionally or knowingly usee, endeavors 
to use, or procures any other person to use or 
endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or 
other device to intercept any oral communica-
tion, when: 
(i) the device ia affixed to, or otherwise 
transmits a signal through a wire, cable, or 
other like connection used in wire communi-
cation; or . 
(ii) the device transmits communications 
by radio, or interferes with the transmission 
of the communication; 
(c) intentionally or knowingly discloses, or en-
deavors to disclose, to any other person the con-
tents of any wire, electronic or oral communica-
tion, knowing or having reason to know that the 
information was obtained through the intercep-
tion of a wire, electronic, or oral communication 
in violation of this section; or 
(d) intentionally or knowingly uses, or en-
deavors to use, the contents of any wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communication, knowing or hav-
ing reason to know that the information waa ob-
tained through the interception of a wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communication in violation of this 
section. 
(2) (a) The operator of a switchboard, or an officer, 
employee, or agent of a provider of wire or elec-
tronic communication service, whose facilities 
are used in the transmission of a wire communi-
cation, may intercept, disclose, or use that com-
munication in the normal course of his employ-
ment while engaged in any activity which ia a 
necessary incident to the rendition of his service 
or to the protection of the rights or property of 
the provider of that service, except a provider of 
wire communications service to the public may 
not utilize service observing or random monitor-
ing except for mechanical or service quality con-
trol checks. 
(b) Providers of wire or electronic communica-
tions service, their officers, employees, agents, 
landlords, custodians, or other persona, may pro-
vide information, facilities, or technical assis-
tance to persona authorised by law to intercept 
wire, oral, or electronic communications or to 
conduct electronic surveillance, if the provider, 
ita officers, employees, agents, landlords, custo-
dians, or other specified persons has been pro-
vided with: 
(i) a court order directing the assistance 
signed by the authorising judge; or 
(ii) a eamfication in writing by a person 
specified in Subsection 77-23a-l<X7), or by 
the attorney general of the state, a deputy 
attorney general, or by a county attorney, or 
by a deputy county attorney, that no warrant 
or court order ia required by law, that all 
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statutory requirement! have been met, and 
tart. the. loaofted asa\iitanc» la reclined. 
(c) The order or certification shall set forth the 
period of tune during which the provision of the 
information, facilities, or technical assistance is 
authorized, and shall specify the information, fa-
cilities, or technical assistance required 
(d) The provider of wire or electronic commu-
nications service, or its officers, employees, 
agents, landlords, custodians, or other specified 
persons may not disclose the existence of any in-
terception or surveillance or the device used to 
accomplish the interception or surveillance re-
garding which the person has been furnished an 
order or certification under this section, except as 
is otherwise required by legal process, and then 
only after prior notification to the attorney gen-
eral of the state or to the county attorney of the 
county in which the interception was conducted, 
as is appropriate 
(e) Any disclosure under Subeection- (2)(d) ren-
ders the person liable for civil damages under 
Section 77-23a-U 
(f) A cause of action does not he in any court 
against any provider of wire or electronic com-
munications service, its officers, employees, 
agents, landlords, custodians, or other specified 
persons for providing information, facilities, or 
assistance in accordance with the terms of a 
court order or certification under this chapter 
(g) Subsections (2Kb) through (f) supersede 
any law to the contrary 
(h) A person acting under color of law may in-
tercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication, 
if that person is a party to the communication, or 
one of the parties to the communication has 
given prior consent to the interception 
(1) A person not acting under color of law may 
intercept a wire or oral communication if that 
person is a party to the communication or where 
one of the parties to the communication has 
given prior consent to the interception, unless 
the communication is intercepted for the purpose 
of committing any criminal or tortious act in vio-
lation of state or federal laws 
(j) An employee of a telephone company may 
intercept a wire communication for the sole pur-
pose of tracing the ongm of the communication 
when the interception is requested by the recipi-
ent of the communication and the recipient al-
leges that the communication is obscene, harass-
ing, or threatening in nature The individual con-
ducting the interception shall notify local police 
authorities within 48 hours after the time of in-
terception, 
(k) A person may 
(1) intercept or access an electronic com-
munication made through an electronic com-
munications system that is configured so 
that the electronic communication is readily 
accessible to the general public, 
(u) intercept any radio communication 
when it is transmitted by 
(A) any station for the use of the gen-
eral pubbc, or that relates to ships, air-
craft, vehicles, or persons in distress, 
(B) any government, law enforce-
ment, civil defense, private land mobile, 
or public safety communications system, 
including police and fire, readily accessi-
ble to the general public, 
(C) a station operating on an autho-
rized frequency within the bands allo-
cated to the amateur, citizens' band, or 
general mobile radio services; or 
(D) by a marine or aeronautics com-
munications system, 
(ui) intercept any wire or electronic com-
munication, the transmission of which is 
causing harmful interference to any lawfully 
operating station or consumer electronic 
equipment, to the extent necessary to iden-
tify the source of the interference, or 
dv) as one of a group of users of the same 
frequency, intercept any radio communica-
tion made through a system that utilizes fre-
quencies monitored by individuals engaged 
in the provision or the use of the system, if 
the communication is not scrambled or 
encrypted 
(1) Under Sections 77-23a-3 through 77-23s-11 
a person may 
d) use a pen register or trap and trace de-
vice, or 
(u) as a provider of electronic communica-
tions service, record the fact that a wire or 
electronic communication was initiated or 
completed, to protect the provider, another 
^QK\da& tassjahuui «KS<C\S* <firc«s4><ha. <sv3^  
pletion of the wire or electronic communica-
tion, or a user of that service, from fraudu-
lent, unlawful, or abusive use of the service 
(3) (a) Except under Subeection (3Kb), a person or 
entity providing an electronic communications 
service to the public may not intentionally di-
vulge the contents of any communication, other 
than the one to the person or entity, or its agent, 
while m transmission on that service to any per-
son or entity other than an addressee or intended 
recipient of the communication or his agent 
(b) A person or entity providing electronic 
communications service to the public may di-
vulge the contents of any communication. 
(l) aa otherwise authorized under Subsec-
tion (2), or Section 77-23a-9, 
(u) with lawful consent of the originator 
or any addressee or intended recipient of the 
communication, 
(m) to a person employed or authorized, or 
whose facilities are used, to forward the com-
munication to its destination, or 
(iv) that is inadvertently obtained by the 
service provider and appears to pertain to 
the commission of a crime, if the divulgence 
ia made to a law enforcement esjtacv, 
(4) (a) Except under Subeection (4Kb) or Subsec-
tion (5), a violation of Subeection (1) is a third 
degree felony 
(b) If the offense is a first offense under Sub-
section (4Xa) and is not for a tortious or illegal 
purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect com-
mercial advantage or private commercial gain, 
and the wire or electronic communication regard-
ing which the offense under Subeection (4Ka) is a 
radio communication that is not scrambled or 
encrypted, and 
d) if the communication is not the radio 
portion of a cellular telephone communica-
tion, a public land mobile radio service com-
munication, or paging service communica-
tion, and the conduct is not under Subsection 
(5), the offense is a class A misdemeanor, 
and 
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(ii) if the communication is the radio por-
tion of s cellular telephone communication, a 
public land mobile radio service communica-
tion, or a paging service communication, the 
offense is a class B misdemeanor, 
(c) Conduct otherwise an offense under this 
subsection, that consists of or relates to the inter-
ception of a satellite transmission that i§ not 
encrypted or scrambled and that is transmitted: 
(i) to a broadcasting station for purposes 
of retransmission to the general public; or 
(ii) as an audio subcarrier intended for re-
distribution to facilities open to the public, 
but not including data transmissions or tele-
phone calls, is not an offense under this sub-
section unless the conduct is for the purpose 
of direct or indirect commercial advantage or 
private financial gain. 
(5) (a) If the communication is a: 
(i) private satellite video communication 
that is not scrambled or encrypted, and the 
conduct in violation of this chapter iB the pri-
vate viewing of that communication and is 
not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for 
purposes of direct or indirect commercial ad-
vantage or private commercial gain; or 
(ii) a radio communication that is trans-
mitted on frequencies allocated under Sub-
part D, Part 74, Rules of the Federal Com-
munication Commission, that is not scram-
bled or encrypted and the conduct in viola-
tion of this chapter is not for a tortious or 
illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or 
indirect commercial advantage or private 
commercial gain, then the person who en-
gages in the conduct is subject to suit by the 
state in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
(b) In an action under Subsection (5)(a): 
(i) If the violation of this chapter is a first 
offense under Subsection (I) and the person 
is not found liable in a civil action under 
Section 77-23a-11, the state may seek appro-
priate injunctive relief. 
(ii) If the violation of this chapter is a sec-
ond or subsequent offense under Subsection 
(1), or the person has been found liable in 
any prior civil action under Section 
77-23a-ll, the person is subject to a manda-
tory $500 civil fine. 
(c) The court may use any means within its 
authority to enforce an injunction issued under 
Subsection (5XbMi), and shall impose a civil fine 
of not less than $500 for each violation of the 
injunction. isss 
T7*23a-5. Traffic in intercepting devices — Of-
fenses — Lawful activities. 
(I) Except as otherwise specifically provided in 
this chapter, any person who intentionally does any 
of the following i§ guilty of a felony of the third de-
gree: 
(a) tends through the mail, or sends or carries 
in intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce. 
any electronic, mechanical, or other device, 
knowing or having reason to know that the de-
sign of the device renders it primarily useful for 
the purpose of the surreptitious interception of 
wire, electronic, or oral communications; 
(b) manufactures, assembles, possesses, or 
sells any electronic, mechanical, or other device, 
knowing or having reason to know that the de-
sign of the device renders it primarily useful for 
the purpose of the surreptitious interception of 
wire, electronic, or oral communications; or 
(c) places in any newspaper, magazine, hand-
bill, or other publication any advertisement of: 
(i) any electronic, mechanical, or other de-
vice knowing or having reason to know that 
the design of the device renders it primarily 
useful for the purpose of the surreptitious 
interception of wire, electronic, or oral com-
munications; or 
(ii) any other electronic, mechanical, or 
other device, where the advertisement pro-
motes the use of the device for the purpose of 
the surreptitious interception of wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communications. 
(2) A provider of wire or electronic communica-
tions service or an officer, agent, or employee of, or a 
person under contract with the provider, may in the 
normal course of the business of providing that wire 
dr electronic communications service, or an officer, 
agent, or employee of, or a person under contract 
with, the United States, a state, or a political subdivi-
sion, in the normal course of the activities of the 
United States, a state, or a political subdivision, to 
send through the mail, send or carry in intrastate, 
interstate, or foreign commerce, or manufacture, as-
semble, pooaesi, or sell any electronic, mechanical, or 
other device knowing or having reason to know that 
the design of the device renders it primarily useful for 
the purpose of surreptitious mterception of wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communications. isss 
77-23a-6. Seizure and forfeiture of intercepting 
device*. 
Any electronic, mechanical or other device used, 
sent, carried, manufactured, assembled, possessed, 
sold, or advertised in violation of Sections 77-23a-4 
and 77-23a-5, may be seized and forfeited to the State 
ofUtah. isss 
77-23a-7. Evidence — Exclusionary role. 
When any wire, electronic or oral communication 
has been intercepted, no part of the contents of the 
communication and no evidence derived from it may 
be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other 
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, depart-
ment, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative 
committee, or other authority of the state, or a politi-
cal subdivision of the state, if the disclosure of that 
information would be in violation of this chapter. 
77-23a-& Court order to authorise or approve 
Interception — Procedure. 
The attorney general of the state, or any assistant 
attorney general specially designated by the attorney 
general or any county attorney or any deputy county 
attorney specially designated by the county attorney, 
may authorise an application to a judge of competent 
jurisdiction for, and the judge may grant in confor-
mity with the procedures for interception of wire, 
electronic or oral communications by any law en-
forcement agency of this state or any political subdi-
visions responsible for the investigation of the type of 
offense regarding which the application is made, an 
order authorizing or approving the interception of a 
wire, electronic, or oral communication by any law 
enforcement agency of this state or any political sub-
division responsible for investigation of the offense 
for which the application IM made, when the intercep-
tion sought may provide or has provided evidence of 
the commission of the offense of murder, kidnapping, 
gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in 
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narcotic drugs, marihuana, or other dangerous drugs, 
or other offense dangerous to life, limb, or property, 
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
year, or any conspiracy to commit any of these of-
fenses its* 
T7-23a-9. Disclosure or use of intercepted infor-
mation. 
(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer 
who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has 
obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communication or evidence derived 
from any of these may disclose those contents to an-
other investigative or law enforcement officer to the 
extent that the disclosure is appropriate to the proper 
performance of the official duties of the officer mak-
ing or receiving the disclosure 
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer 
who, by any means authorized by this chapter has 
obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communication or evidence derived 
from any of them may use those contents to the ex-
tent the use is appropriate to the proper performance 
of his official duties 
(3) Any person who has received, by any means 
authorized by this chapter, any information concern-
ing a wire, electronic, or oral communication or evi-
dence derived from any of them intercepted in accor-
dance with this chapter may disclose the contents of 
that communication or the derivative evidence while 
giving testimony under oath or affirmation m any 
proceeding held under the authority of the United 
States or of any state or political subdivision 
(4) An otherwise privileged wire, electronic or oral 
communication intercepted in accordance with or in 
violation of, the provisions of this chapter does not 
lose its privileged character 
(5) When an investigative or law enforcement offi-
cer, while engaged in intercepting wire, electronic, or 
oral communications in the manner authorized, in-
tercepts wire, electronic, or oral communications re-
lating to offenses other than those specified in the 
order of authorization or approval, the contents, and 
evidence derived from the contents may be disclosed 
or used as provided in Subsections (1) and (2) The 
contents and any evidence derived from them may be 
used under Subsection (3) when authorized or ap-
proved by a judge of competent jurisdiction if the 
judge finds on subsequent application that the con-
tents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with 
this chapter The application shall be made as soon as 
practicable. less 
77-23a-10. Application for order — Authority of 
order — Emergency action — Applica-
tion — Entry — Conditions — Exten-
sions — Recordings — Admissibility or 
suppression — Appeal by state. 
(1) Each application for an order authorizing or ap-
proving the interception of a wire, electronic or oral 
communication shall be made in writing upon oath or 
affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction, and 
shall state the applicant's authority to make the ap-
plication. Each application shall include the follow-
m e 
(a) the identity of the investigative or law en-
forcement officer making the application, and the 
officer authorizing the application, 
(b) a full and complete statement of the facts 
and circumstances relied upon by the applicant 
to justify his belief that an order should be is-
sued, including* 
(i) details regarding the particular offense 
that has been, is being, or is about to be com* 
mitted, 
(n) except as provided in Subsection (11), 
a particular description of the nature and lo-
cation of the facilities from which or the 
place where the communication is to be in-
tercepted, 
(in) a particular description of the type of 
communication sought to be intercepted, and 
(IV) the identity of the person, if known, 
committing the offense and whose communi-
cation is to be intercepted, 
(c) a full and complete statement as to whether 
other investigative procedures have been tried 
and failed or why they reasonably appear to be 
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous, 
(d) a statement of the period of tune for which 
the interception is required to be maintained, 
and if the nature of the investigation is such that 
the authorization for interception should not au-
tomatically terminate when the described type of 
communication has been first obtained, a partic-
ular description of facts establishing probable 
cause to believe that additional communications 
of the same type will occur thereafter, 
(e) a full and complete statement of the facts 
concerning sll previous applications known to 
the individual authorizing and the individual 
making the application, made to any judge for 
authorization to intercept, or for approval of in-
terceptions of wire, electronic or oral communi-
cations involving any of the same persons, facili-
ties, or places specified in the application, and 
the action taken by the judge on each applica-
tion, 
(f) when the application is for the extension of 
an order, a statement setting forth the results so 
for obtained from the interception, or a reason* 
able explanation of the failure to obtain results; 
and 
(g) additional testimony or documentary evi-
dence in support of the application as the judge 
may require 
(2) Upon application, the judge may enter an ex 
parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing 
or approving interception of wire, electronic, or oral 
communications within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the state, if the judge determines on the beau of the 
facts submitted by the applicant that 
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an 
individual is committing, has committed, or is 
about to commit a particular offense enumerated 
in Section T7-23a-8, 
(b) there is probable cause for belief that par-
ticular communications concerning that offense 
will be obtained through the mterception, 
^c) normal investigative procedures have been 
tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be 
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous, 
(d) except under Subsection (11), there is prob-
able cause for belief that the facilities from 
which, or the place where, the wire, electronic, or 
oral communications are to be intercepted are 
being used, or are about to be used, in connection 
with the commission of the offense, or are leased 
to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by 
that person 
(3) Each order authorizing or approving the inter-
ception of any wire, electronic, or oral communication 
shall specify-
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(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose 
communications are to be intercepted, 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (11), the 
nature and location of the communications facili-
ties as to which, or the place where, authority to 
intercept is granted, 
(c) a particular description of the type of com-
munication sought to be intercepted, and a state-
ment of the particular offense to which it relates, 
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to in-
tercept the communications, and of the persons 
authorizing the application, and 
(e) the period of time during which the inter-
ception is authorized, including a statement as to 
whether the interception shall automatically ter-
minate when the described communication has 
been first obtained 
(4) An order authorizing the interception of a wire, 
electronic, or oral communication shall, upon request 
of the applicant, direct that a provider of wire or elec-
tronic communications service, landlord, custodian, 
or other person shall furnish the applicant forthwith 
all information, facilities, and technical assistance 
necessary to accomplish the interception unobtru-
sively and with a minimum of interference with the 
services that the provider, landlord, custodian, or per-
son is according the person whose communications 
are to be intercepted Any provider of wire or elec-
tronic communications service, landlord, custodian, 
or other person furnishing the facilities or technical 
assistance shall be compensated by the applicant for 
reasonable expenses involved in providing the facili-
ties or systems 
(5) (a) An order entered under this chapter may 
not authorize or approve the interception of any 
wire, electronic, or oral communication for any 
period longer than is necessary to achieve the 
objective of the authorization, nor in any event 
longer than 30 days The 30 day period begins on 
the day the investigative or law enforcement offi-
cer first begins to conduct an interception under 
the order, or ten days after the order is entered, 
whichever is earlier 
(b) Extensions of an order may be granted, but 
only upon application for an extension made un-
der Subsection (1), and if the court makes the 
findings required by Subsection (2) The period of 
extension may be no longer than the authorizing 
judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes 
for which it was granted, but in no event for lon-
ger than 30 days 
(c) Every order and extension shall contain a 
provision that the authorization to intercept 
shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be 
conducted so as to minimize the interception of 
communications not otherwise subject to inter-
ception under this chapter, and must terminate 
upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in 
any event within 30 days 
(d) If the intercepted communication is in a 
code or foreign language, and an expert in that 
foreign language or code is not reasonably avail-
able during the interception period, minimiza-
tion may be accomplished aa soon aa practicable 
titer the interception 
(e) An interception under this chapter may be 
conducted in whole or in part by government per-
sonnel, or by an individual operating under a 
contract with the government, acting under su-
pervision of an investigative or law enforcement 
officer authorized to conduct the interception 
(6) When an order authorizing interception la en-
tered under this chapter, the order may require re-
ports to be made to the judge who issued the order, 
showing what progress has been made toward 
achievement of the authorized objective and the need 
for continued interception These reports shall be 
made at intervals the judge may require 
(7) Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
chapter, any investigative or law enforcement officer, 
designated by the attorney general of the state, a dep-
uty attorney general, a county attorney, or a deputy 
county attorney, acting pursuant to a state statute, 
who reasonsbly determines that 
• (a) an emergency situation exists that in-
volves 
d) immediate danger of death or serious 
physical injury to any person, 
<u) conspiratorial activities threatening 
the national security interest, or 
(in) conspiratorial activities characteristic 
of organized crime, that require a wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communication to be inter-
cepted before an order authorizing intercep-
tion can, with diligence, be obtained, and 
(b) there are grounds upon which an order 
could be entered under this chapter to authorise 
the interception, may intercept wire, electronic, 
or oral communication if an application for an 
order approving the interception is made in ac-
cordance with this section, within 48 hours after 
the interception has occurred, or begins to occur 
In the absence of an order, the interception 
shall immediately terminate when the communi-
cation sought is obtained or when the application 
for the order is denied, whichever is earlier If the 
application for approval is denied, or in any other 
case where the interception is terminated with-
out an order having been issued, the contents of 
any wire, electronic, or oral communication in-
tercepted shall be treated as having been ob-
tained in violation of this chapter, and an inven-
tory shall be served aa provided for in Subsection 
(8Xd) on the person named in the application. 
(8) (a) The contents of any wire, electronic or oral 
communication intercepted by any means autho-
rized by this chapter shall, if possible, be re-
corded on tape or wire or other comparable de-
vice The recording of the contents of any wire, 
electronic or oral communication under this sub-
section shall be done so as to protect the record-
ing from editing or other alterations. Immedi-
ately upon the expiration of the period of an or-
der, or extension, the recordings shall be made 
available to the judge issuing the order and 
sealed under his directions Custody of the re-
cordings shall be where the judge orders The re-
cordings may not be destroyed, except upon an 
order of the issuing or denying judge In any 
•vent, it shall be kept for ten years. Duplicate 
recordings may be made for use or disclosure un-
der Subsection* 77-23a-9(l) and (2) for investiga-
tions. The presence of the seal provided by this 
subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the 
absence of one, is a prerequisite for the use or 
disclosure of the contents of any wire, electronic 
or oral communication or evidence derived from 
it under Subeection 7?-23a-9(3) 
(b) Applications made and orders granted un-
der this chapter shall be sealed by the judge Cue-
tody of the application* and orders shall be where 
the judge direct*. The application* and orders 
shall be disclosed only upon a showing of good 
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cause before a judge of competent jurisdiction 
and may not be destroyed, except on order of the 
issuing or denying judge But in any event they 
shall be kept for ten years 
(c) Any violation of any provision of this sub-
section msy be punished as contempt of the issu-
ing or denying judge 
(d) Within a reasonable tune, but not later 
than 90 days after the filing of an application for 
an order o( approval under Subsection 
77-23a-l(X7) that is denied or the termination of 
the period of an order or extensions, the issuing 
or denying judge shall cause to be served on the 
persons named in the order or the application, 
and other parties to intercepted communications 
as the judge determines in his discretion is in the 
interest of justice, an inventory, which shall in-
clude notice of 
(1) the entry of the order or application, 
(u) the date of the entry and the period of 
authorization, approved or disapproved in-
terception, or the denial of the application, 
and 
(ui) that during the penod wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communications were or were 
not intercepted. 
(e) The judge, upon filing of a motion, may in 
his discretion make available to the person or his 
counsel for inspection the portion* of the inter-
cepted communications, applications, and orders 
the judge determines to be in the interest of jus-
tice On an ex parte showing of good cause to a 
judge of competent jurisdiction the serving of the 
inventory required by this subsection may be 
postponed 
(9) The contents of any intercepted wire, elec-
tronic, or oral communication, or evidence derived 
from any of them, may not be received in evidence or 
otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding in a federal or state court unless each party, 
not less than ten days before the trial, hearing, or 
proceeding, has been furnished with a copy of the 
court order, and accompanying application, under 
which the interception was authorized or approved. 
This ten-day period may be waived by the judge if he 
finds that it was not possible to furnish the party 
with the above information ten days before the trial, 
hearing, or proceeding and that the party will not be 
prejudiced by the delay in receiving the information. 
(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hear-
ing, or proceeding in or before any court, depart-
ment, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other 
authority of the United States Utah, or a politi-
cal subdivision, may move to suppress the con-
tents of any intercepted wire, electronic, or oral 
communication, or evidence denved from any of 
them, on the grounds that 
(l) the communication was unlawfully in-
tercepted, 
(u) the order of authorization or approval 
under which it was intercepted is insuffi-
cient on its face, or 
(in) the interception was not made in con-
formity with the order of authorization or 
approval 
(b) The motion shall be made before the trial, 
hearing, or proceeding unless there was no oppor-
tunity to make the motion or the person was not 
aware of the grounds of the motion If the motion 
is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire, 
electronic or oral communication, or evidence 
denved from any of them, shall be treated as 
having been obtained in violation of this chapter 
The judge, upon the filing of the motion by the 
aggrieved person, may in his discretion make 
available to the aggrieved person or his counsel 
for inspection portions of the intercepted commu-
nication or evidence denved from them as the 
judge determines to be in the interests of justice 
(c) In addition to any other nght to appeal, the 
state may appeal from an order granting a mo-
tion to suppress made under Subsection (lOXa), 
or the denial of an application for an order of 
approval, if the attorney bringing the appeal cer-
tifies to the judge or other official granting the 
motion or denying the application that the ap-
peal is not taken for the purposes of delay The 
appeal shall be taken within 30 days after the 
date the order was entered, and shall be dili-
gently prosecuted 
(d) The remedies and sanctions descnbed in 
this chapter regarding the interception of elec-
tronic communications are the only judicial rem-
edies and sanctions for nonconstitutional viola-
tions of this chapter involving these communica-
tions 
(11) The requirements of Subsections UXbXu), and 
(2)(d), and (3Kb) of this section relating to the specifi-
cation of the facilities from which, or the place where 
the communication is to be intercepted do not apply 
if 
(a) in the case of an applicant regarding the 
interception of an oral communication, 
d) the application is by a law enforcement 
officer and is approved by the state attorney 
general, a deputy attorney general, a county 
attorney, or a deputy county attorney, 
(u) the application contains a full and 
complete statement of why the specification 
is not practical, and identifies the person 
committing the offense and whose communi-
cations are to be intercepted, 
(in) the judge finds that the specification 
is not practical, and 
(b) in the case of an apphcaUon regarding wire 
or electronic communication, 
d) the application is by a law enforcement 
officer and is approved by the state attorney 
general, a deputy attorney general, a county 
attorney, or a deputy county attorney; 
(u) the application identifies the person 
believed to be committing the offense and 
whose communications are to be intercepted, 
and the applicant makes a showing of a pur-
pose, on the part of that person, to thwart 
interception by changing facilities, and 
(ui) the judge finds that the purpose has 
been adequately shown. 
(12) (a) An interception of a communication under 
an order regarding which the requirements of 
Subsections UXbXu), (2Kd), and (3Kb) do not ap-
ply by reason of Subsection (11), does not begin 
until the facilities from which, or the place 
where, the communication is to be intercepted is 
ascertained by the person implementing the in-
terception order 
(b) A provider of wire or electronic communi-
cations service that has received an order under 
Subsection (11Kb) may move the court to modify 
or quash the order on the ground that its assis-
tance with respect to the interception cannot be 
performed in a timely or reasonable fashion. The 
court, upon notice to the government, shall de-
ads the motion expeditiously isss 
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77-23a-ll. Civil remedy for unlawful intercep-
tion — Action for relief. 
(1) Except under Subaection 77-23a-4<2)(b), a per-
son whoee wire, electronic, or oral communication ta 
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in viola-
tion of this chapter may in a civil action recover from 
the person or entity that engaged in the violation, 
relief as appropriate 
(2) In an action under this section appropriate re-
lief includes 
(a) preliminary and other equitable or declara-
tory relief, as is appropriate, 
(b) damages under Subsection (3) and punitive 
damages in appropriate cases, and 
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and reasonably 
incurred litigation costs 
(3) (a) In an action under this section, if the con-
duct in violation of this chapter is the private viewing 
of a private satellite video communication that is not 
scrambled or encrypted, or if the communication is a 
radio communication that is transmitted on frequen-
cies allocated under Subpart (D), Part 74, Rules of the 
Federal Communications Commission, that is not 
scrambled or encrypted, and the conduct is not for a 
tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or 
indirect commercial advantage or private commercial 
gain, the court shall assess damages as follows 
d) if the person who engaged in the con-
duct has not previously been enjoined under 
Subsection 77-23a-4<5) and has not been 
found liable in a prior avil action under this 
section, the court shall assess the greater of 
the sum of actual damages suffered by the 
plaintiff, or the statutory damages of not less 
than $50 nor more than 1500, 
(u) if on one pnor occasion the person who 
engaged in the conduct has been enjoined 
under Subsection 77-23a-4(5) or has been lia-
ble in a cml action under this section, the 
court shall sssesi the greater of the sum of 
actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or 
statutory damages of not less than $100 and 
not more than $1,000, 
(b) In any other action under this section, the 
court may assess as damages whichever is the 
greater of 
d) the sum of the actual damages suffered 
by the plaintiff and any profits made by the 
violator as a result of the violations or 
(u) statutory damages of $100 a day for 
each day of violation, or $10,000, whichever 
is greater. 
(4) A good faith reliance on 
(a) a court order, a grand jury subpoena, a leg-
islative authorization, or a statutory authoriza-
tion, 
(b) a request of an investigative or law en-
forcement officer under Subsection 77-23a-10(7)f 
or 
(c) a good faith determination that Subaection 
77-23a-4(3) permitted the conduct complained of 
and is a complete defense against any civil or 
criminal action brought under this chapter or 
any other law 
(5) A civil action under this section may not be 
commenced later than two years after the date upon 
which the claimant first has a reasonable opportunity 
to discover the violation. isas 
77-23a*12. Enjoining a violation — Civil action 
by attorney general 
(1) When it appears that a person is engaged or la 
about to engage in any act that constitutes or will 
constitute a felony violation of this chapter, the attor-
ney general may initiate a civil action in a district 
court of the state to enjoin the violation. 
(2) The court shall proceed ss soon aa practicable to 
the hearing and determination of the action, and 
may, at any time before final determination, enter a 
restraining order or prohibition, or take other action 
aa warranted to prevent a continuing and substantial 
injury to the state or to any person or class of persons 
for whose protection the action is brought 
(3) A proceeding under this section is governed by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, except if an infor-
mation has been filed or an indictment has been re-
turned against the respondent, discovery is governed 
by the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure ISSS 
77-23a-13. Installation of device when court or-
der required — Penalty. 
(1) Except as provided in this section, a person may 
not install or use a pen register or trap or trace device 
without previously obtaining a court order under Sec-
tion 77-23a-15, or under federal law 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the uae of a pen 
register or trap and trace device by a provider of elec-
tronic or wire communications services. 
(a) relating to the operation, maintenance, and 
testing of a wire or electronic communications 
service or to the protection of the rights or prop-
erty of the provider, or to the protection of users 
of that service from abuse of service or unlawful 
uae of service, or 
(b) to record that a wire or electronic commu-
nication was initiated or completed to protect the 
provider, another provider furnishing service to-
ward the completion of the wire communication, 
or a user of that service from fraudulent, unlaw-
ful, or abusive use of that service, or 
(c) when the consent of the user of that service 
has been obtained. 
(3) A knowing or intentional violation of Subsec-
tion (1) is a class A misdemeanor isas 
77-23e>14. Court order for installation — Appli-
cation, 
(1) The attorney general, a deputy attorney gen-
eral, a county attorney, a deputy county attorney, or 
a prosecuting attorney for a political subdivision of 
the state, or a law enforcement officer, may make 
application for an order or extension of an order un-
der Section 77-23a-15 authorizing or approving the 
installation and use of a pen register or trap and 
trace device, in writing and under oath or equivalent 
affirmation, to a court of competent jurisdiction 
(2) An application under Subsection (1) shall in-
clude 
(a) the identity of the attorney for the govern-
ment or the law enforcement or investigative of-
ficer making the application and the identity of 
the law enforcement agency conducting the in-
vestigation, and 
(b) a certification by the applicant that the in-
formation likely to be obtained is relevant to an 
ongoing criminal investigation being conducted 
by that agency isas 
77-23a-l& Order for installation — Contents — 
Duration — Extension — Disclosure. 
(1) In general, upon in application made under 
Section 77-23a-14, the court shall enter an ax parte 
order authorizing the installation and uae of a pen 
register or trap and trace device within the junadic-
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tion of the court, if the court finds that the attorney 
for the government or the law enforcement or investi-
gative officer has certified to the court that the infor-
mation likely to be obtained by the installation and 
use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation 
(2) (a) An order issued under this section shall 
specify 
(1) the identity, if known, of the person to 
whom is leased or in whose name is listed 
the telephone line to which the pen register 
or trap and trace device is to be attached, 
(u) the identity, if known, of the person 
who is the subject of the criminal investiga-
tion, 
(ui) the number and, if known, physical 
location of the telephone line to which the 
pen register or trap and trace device is to be 
attached and, in the case of a trap and trace 
device, the geographical limits of the trap 
and trace order; and 
dv) a statement of the offense to which the 
information likely to be obtained by the pen 
register or trap and trace device relates 
(b) The order shall direct, upon the request of 
the applicant, the furnishing of information, fa-
cilities, and technical assistance necessary to ac-
complish the installation of the pen register or 
trap and trace device under Section 77 -23a-16 
(3) (a) An order issued under this section may au-
thorize the installation and use of a pen register 
or trap and trace device for a period not to exceed 
60 days 
(b) Extensions of an order may be granted, but 
only upon an application for an order under Sec-
tion 77-23a-14 and upon the judicial finding re-
quired by Subsection (1) The period of extensi6n 
shall be for a penod not to exceed 60 days 
(4) An order authorizing or approving the installa-
tion and use of a pen register or trap and trace device 
shall direct that 
(a) the order be sealed until otherwise ordered 
by the court, and 
(b) the person owning or leasing the line to 
which the pen register or trap and trace device is 
attached, or who has been ordered by the court to 
provide assistance to the applicant, not disclose 
the existence of the pen register or trap and trace 
device or the existence of the investigation to the 
listed subscriber, or to any other person, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court isss 
77-23a-16. Communications provider — Cooper-
ation and support services — Compen-
sation — Liability defense 
(1) Upon the request of an attorney for the govern-
ment or an officer of a law enforcement agency autho-
rized to install and use pen registers under this chap-
tar, a provider of wire or electronic communications 
service, landlord, custodian, or other person shall fur-
mah investigative or law enforcement officers forth-
with all information, facilities, and technical assis-
tance necessary to accomplish the installation of the 
pen register unobtrusively and with a minimum of 
interference with the services the person ordered by 
the court accords the party regarding whom the in-
stallation and use is to take place, if such assistance 
is directed by a court order as provided in Subsecuon 
77-23a-15(2Xb) of this chapter 
(2) (a) Upon request of an attorney for the govern-
ment or an officer of a law enforcement agency 
authorized to receive the results of a trap and 
trace device under this chapter, a provider of 
wire or electronic communications service, land-
lord, custodian, or other person shall install the 
device forthwith on the appropriate line. 
(b) He shall also furnish the investigative or 
law enforcement officer all additional informa-
tion, facilities, and technical assistance, includ-
ing installation and operation of the device unob-
trusively and with a minimum of interference 
with the services that the person so ordered by 
the court accords the party with respect to whom 
the installation and use is to take place, if the 
installation and assistance is directed by a court 
order under Subsection 77-23a-15(2)(b) 
(c) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the 
results of the trap and trace device shall be fur-
nished to the officer of the law enforcement 
agency designated by the court, at reasonable in-
tervals and during regular business hours, for 
the duration of the order 
(3) A provider of wire or electronic communica-
tions service, landlord, custodian, or other person who 
furnishes facilities or technical assistance under this 
section shall be reasonably compensated for reason-
able expenses incurred in providing the facilities and 
assistance 
(4) A cause of action does not lie in any court 
against the provider of wire or electronic communica-
tions service, its officers, employees, agents, or other 
specified persons, for providing information, facili-
ties, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a 
court order under this chapter 
(5) A good faith reliance on a court order, a legisla-
tive authorization, or a statutory authorization, is a 
complete defense against any civil or criminal action 
brought under this chapter or any other law isss 
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77-23b-2 Interference with access to stored com-
munication — Offenses — Penalties 
77-23b-3 Revealing stored electronic communica-
tion — Prohibitions — Penalties 
77-23b-4 Disclosure by a provider — Grounds for 
requiring disclosure — Court order 
77-23b-5 Backup copy of communications — 
When required of provider — Court 
order — Procedures 
77-23b-€. Notifying subscriber or customer of 
court order — Requested delay — 
Grounds — Limits 
77-23b-7 Fee for services of provider of informa-
tion. 
77-23b-8 Violation of chapter — Civil action by 
provider or subscriber — Good faith 
defense. 
77-23b-9 Judicial scope of chapter remedies and 
sanctions, 
77.23b-l. Definitions. 
(1) Terms used in this chapter and defined in Sec-
tion 77-23a-3 have the definitions given in that sec-
tion 
(2) As used in this chapter, the term ''remote com-
puting service" means provision to the public of com-
puter storage or processing services by means of an 
electronic communications system. isss 
SECTION II 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNT, STATE OF UTAH 
APPLICATION FOR AN 
EXPARTE ORDER 
AUTHORIZING THE 
INTERCEPTION OF WIRE 
(TELEPHONIC) 
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND 
FROM TELEPHONE NUMBER 
(801) 111-1*729 
STATE OF UTAH, EXPARTE, 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
TELEPHONE NUMBER (801) 731-4739 
LISTED TO SHERRY BLIVEN 
AT THE ADDRESS OF 1096 NO. 5900 W. 
WEST WARREN, UTAH 
BILLED TO: SHERRY BLIVEN 
AT THE ADDRESS OF 1096 NO. 5900 W. 
WEST WARREN, UTAH 
Comes now Donald C. Hughes, Weber County Attorney, being duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
That he, Donald C. Hughes, is the County Attorney for Weber County, State 
of Utah. 
That he, Donald C. Hughes, has read the sworn Affidavit which is hereby 
incorporated by reference of Glen M. Warner, a peace officer with Ogden City 
Police Department, State of Utah, and that he is known to him to be a sworn 
peace officer in the State of Utah. 
That he, Donald C. Hughesr has read the Application for an Exparte Order 
authorizing interception of wire (telephonic) communication on telephone number 
(801) 731-1»739, and the accompanying sworn Affidavit of Glen M. Warner in 
connection with that Application, and the Exparte Order authorizing the 
interception of wire (telephonic) communications on (801) 731-^739, all of 
which are listed in the incorporated Affidavit and incorporated into this 
Application. 
That he, Donald C. Hughes, believes the information contained in this 
Application, including the documents referred to in Paragraph (2) of this 
Application, indicate that crimes involving illegal drugs, to wit: violations of 
Utah Controlled Substance Act, Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
Amended, and the Law of Conspiracy to violate the Controlled Substance Act in 
violation of Section 76-M-201, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, and the 
soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally aiding the 
commission of the above enumerated crimes in violation of Section 76-2-202, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, involving the possession of controlled substances 
with intent to distribute, to wit: cocaine; the conspiracy to commit these 
offenses and soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally 
aiding the commission of these offenses, all of which are felonies, punishable 
by more than one year in the Utah State Prison, have been committed, are being 
committed, and will be committed in the future. 
That he, Donald C. Hughes, based upon the foregoing, believes that evidence 
of the heretofore mentioned crimes may be obtained by interception of wire 
(telephonic) communication and interception of such communications pursuant 
to Section 77-23a-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, and Title III of 
Public Law 90-351 U, S, Code. 
That the communications to be intercepted are telephone conversations 
held over the telephone bearing the number (801) 731-**739, located at the 
residence at 1096 No. 5900 W., West Warren, Weber County, Utah, which is a 
single family, rambler style, dwelling located in an agricultural area of 
Weber County, Utah and listed to and billed to Sherry Bliven. 
That other investigative techniques, as set out in detail in the accompanying 
Affidavit and incorporated herein, have been tried and failed or resonably 
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appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or too dangerous. 
That the authorization to intercept these wire (telephonic) communications 
be permitted for a period of thirty (30) days, tweaty-four (2k) hours a day, 
and not to terminate upon the initial interception of incriminating" conversations 
of David J. Hunt and other co-conspiritors, and others known and as yet unknown 
or unidentified who are selling them or applying them or are buying from them 
or being supplied by them controlled substances, to wit: cocaine. 
Based upon the facts contained in the sworn Affidavit of Glen M. Warner, 
incorporated fully herein by reference, there is probable cause to believe that 
this is a continuing, ongoing, criminal conspiracy engaged in the distribution 
and purchase of controlled substances, to wit: cocaine, and that additional 
communications of the same type sought to be intercepted will occur after the 
sought after communications have been first obtained. 
_. That no previous applications to intercept communications involving the 
telephone referred to herein have been made or issued. 
Further, that in order to aid in reaching the objectives or the applied 
for Order, and to aid in minimizing the interception of communications not 
authorized to be intercepted, your applicant requests that that Order authorize 
both the installation of a Pen Register (number dialed recorder) on the communi-
cations facilities designated in the supporting Affidavits in order to locate 
and identify other communications facilities associated with outgoing telephone 
calls, and toll record information pertaining to telephone number (801) 731-^739 
listed to Sherry Bliven, located at 1096 No. 5900 W., West Warren, Weber County, 
Utah. 
Therefore, it is specifically requested that Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company be directed to furnish Ogden City Police Department all 
information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish 
the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the 
services that such company is according to the personpr persons whose com-
munications are to be intercepted. 
,._ w/ 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY ( S ^ // 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
The above person 
SS. 
3 personally appeared before 
me, and subscribed and jiworn here to this -J& day of \JUsCty~ 
1986, by "' 
NOTARY f$BLIC 
My commission expires: 
<*JwJn 
DONALD C. HUGHES 
Weber County Attorney 
7th Floor Municipal Bldg. 
Ogdenf Utah 84401 
(801) 399-8377 
SECEND JUDICIAL DISTRICT (DUET OF WEBER ODUMTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, Exparte 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
TELEFHCNE WVBER (801) 731-4739 
LISTED TO SHERRY BLIVEN AT SHE 
ADERESS OF 1096 N. 5900 W., 
WEST WARREN, UTAH. 
MOTION NDNC HO TONC 
Case No. 
(DMES NCW, Donald C. .Hughes, J r . , Weber County Attorney, and moves the 
Court for an order Nunc Pro Tunc. I t appears that the original application in 
the above-entitled matter upon which the Court granted the original intercept 
order, was not ful ly executed. Die dociment was prepared and r e v i s e d under iry 
direction. I conversed with the Honorable John F. Wahlquist concerning our 
support for the intercept and in conjunction with Sergeant Glen M. Warner, the 
affiant in a l l of the supporting affidavits presented the application to Judge 
Wahlquist to secure the order. I fu l ly approved the application in i t s f inal 
form, but due to a c ler ical oversight the f inal draft accanparying the Judge1 s 
order was not executed. 
MDTIDN 
Bage TWO 
THEREFORE, i t i s hereby moved that the original cbcunent new be executed ty 
nyself with i t s effect Nine Pro Tuic. 
DATED this 26th day of July, 1986. 
Weber County Attorney 
QREER 
Upon the reading of the Motion of Donald C Hughes, Jr., and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY OREERED that Donald C. Hughes, Jr., execute the original 
Application forthwith to have been effective Nunc Pro Tunc to May 23, 1986 at 
1209 hours. 
EATED this 26th day of July, 1986. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' 
ooOoo 
F I L E D 
CWy at !f*i-Covri 
Ufr* C&ert of AWtfs1 
ORDER 
Case No. 880386-CA 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
David J. Hunt# 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Davidson (On Law and Motion). 
This matter is before the court on appellant's Application 
for Continuation of a Certificate of Probable Cause, which was 
transferred from the Utah Supreme Court on November 6, 1989. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the remittitur issued by this 
court on October 30, 1989 is recalled as improvidently granted 
under the circumstances of this case, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the remittitur shall be stayed 
up to and including December 4, 1989, which is the period 
allowed by the Utah Supreme Court for filing of a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari in this case, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT a further stay of the 
remittitur shall be in accordance with the terms of R. Utah Ct. 
App. 36(c) providing for stay pending disposition of a petition 
for writ of certiorari. 
DATED this j£f day of November, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Gregor Orme, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on 16, November 1989 I mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by depositing the same with 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Randine Salerno 
Attorney for Appellant 
2568 Washington Blvd., #205 
Ogden, UT 84401 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
Dan R. Larsen 
Assistant Attorney General 
B U I L D I N G M A I L 
Honorable David E. Roth 
Second District Court 
2549 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Second District Court 
Court Clerk 
2549 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Case No. 17750 
DATED this 16th day of November, 1989. 
By 
Kathleen Flynn \ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
SECTION II 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAT, EXPARTE'4 
IN THE MATTER -.OF: 
TELEPHONE NUMBER (801) 731-^739 
LISTED TO SHERRY BLIVEN 
AT THE ADDRESS OF 1096 NO. 5900 W. 
West Warren, Utah 
BILLED TO: SHERRY BLIVEN 
AT THE ADDRESS OF 1096 No. 5900 W. 
West Warren, Utah <) 
APPLICATION FOR AN 
EXPARTE ORDER 
AUTHORIZING THE 
EXTENSION OF THE 
INTERCEPTION OF WIRE 
(TELEPHONIC) 
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND 
FROM TELEPHONE NUMBER 
(801) 731-^739 
Comes now William F. Daines, a duly authorized deputy Weber Co. attorney, 
being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
that he, William F. Daines, is a deputy County Attorney for Weber County, State of Utah. 
That he, William F. Daines has read the sworn affidavit which is hereby incorporated 
by reference of Glen M. Warner, a peace officer with Ogden City Police Department 
State of Utah, and that he is known to him to be a sworn peace officer in the State 
of Utah. 
That he, William F. Daines, has read the Application for an Exparte Order authorizing 
interception of wire (telephonic) communication on telephone number (801) 731-^739, 
and the accompanying sworn affidavit of Glen M. Warner in connection with that 
Application, and the exparte order authorizing the interception of wire (telephonic) 
communications on (801)731-^739, all of which are listed in the incorporated 
Affidavit and incorporated into the Application. 
That he, William F. Daines, believes the information in this Application, including 
the documents referred to in paragraph (2) of this Application, indicate that crimes 
involving illelal drugs, to wit: violations of Utah Controlled Substance Act, Section 
58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated. 1953 as Amended, and the Law of Conspiracy to violate 
the Controlled Substance Act in violation of Section 76-4-201, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 AS AMENDED, and the soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging ot 
intentionally aiding the comission of the above enumerated crimes in violation 
of Section 76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, involving the possession 
of controlled substances with intent to distribute, to wit: cocaine; the conspiracy 
to comit these offenses and soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging or 
intentionally aiding the commission of these offenses, all of which are felonies, 
punishable by more htan one year in the Utah State Prison, have been committed, 
are being committed, and will be committed in the future. 
That he, William F. Daines, based upon the foregoing, believes that evidence of 
the heretofore mentioned crimes may be obtained by interception of wire (telephonic) 
communication and interception of such communications pursuant to Section 
77-23a-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, and Title III of Public Law 90-351 
U.S. Code. 
That the communications to be intercepted are telephone conversations held over the 
telephone bearing the number 801 731-4739, locatedJ.at the residence at 1096N 5900 W. 
West Warren, Weber County, Utah, which is a single fanily, rambler style, dwelling 
located in an agricultural area of Weber County, Utah and listed too and billed to 
Sherry Bliven. 
That *ther investigative techniques, as set out in detail in the accompanying 
Affidavit and incorporated herein, have been tried and failed or reasona^by appear 
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or too dangerous. 
That the authorization to intercept these wire (telephonic) communications be 
permitted for a period of thirty (30) days, twenty four (24) hours a day and 
not to terminate upon the initial interception of incriminating converstiaons 
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of David J. Hunt and otner co-conspiritors, and others known and as yet unknown 
or unidentified who are selling them or applying them or are buying f^ pom them 
or being supplied by them controlled substances, to wit: cocaine. 
Based upon the facts contained in the sworn affidavit of Glen M. Warner.incorporated 
fully herein by reference, there is probable cause to believe that this is 
a continuing, ongoing, criminal conspiracy engaged in the distribution and 
purchase of controlled substances, to wit: cocaine, and that additionalcommunications 
of the same type sought to be intercepted will occur after thesought after comraunicatior 
have been first obtained. 
The previous application for interception of telephonic communications is the 
one for which an order was granted on May 23, 1986, to become effective May 
29, 1986. This application is for an order extending that granted application. 
No other applications are known to your affiant. 
A statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the original interception 
are found in the affidavit for extension, which is incorporated herein. 
Further, that in order to aid in reaching the objectives of the applied for order, 
and to aid in minimizing the interception of communications not authorized to 
be intercepted, your applicant requests that that order authorize both the installation 
of a pen register (number dialed recorder) on the communications facilities 
designated in the supporting Affidavits in order to locate and identify other 
communications facilities associated with outgoing telephone calls, and toll record 
information pertaining to telephone numben(80l) 731-^739 listed to Sherry Bliven, 
located at 1096N 5900 W., West Warren, Weber County, Utah 
Therefore, it is specifically requested that Mountain States Telephone and telegraph 
Company be directed to furnish Ogden City Police Department all information, 
facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception •' 
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urr^btrusively 
i s arccoMing t 
witn a r.iX f^tum of interS^e/ence with \h*serv ices t \ay 'sucn ccr.fcar.y 
person /r^S^ersons who/e e<^unicatzonfc are to b/ in tercepted . 
SI trr ULHITY WLritH LUUNTi ATTUHNtY dLA^AXd 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
) SS, 
) 
The above person h),'fJiyi^m ) . 7- jQnt^j^a^ personally appeared before me, 
and subscribed and sworn to this J? 7 £%s day of (T^UST^U/ • 
1986, by (j@4/,Mi/^<?%yffito 
NOTARY PUBLIC ' ^ 
My commission expires: 
* f W /, /?f? 
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